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Recently, hackers has been developing fast propagat-
ing worms exploiting vulnerabilities that had just been dis-
closed by security experts. Those attacks particularly ex-
pose servers: this class of applications is constantly con-
nected to the Internet and must meet uptime constraints.
Hence they often run unprotected until the next scheduled
update.
In this paper, we propose a just-in-time protection for
servers based on runtime injection of pre-made patches.
The runtime injection permits to deal with uptime con-
straints and induces only a minimal overhead over the vul-
nerable code and only when a vulnerability is known to ex-
ist. The pre-made patches forbid exploitation of most com-
mon vulnerabilities (45% of attacks reported by Debian se-
curity in 2005 affecting C softwares) and allows continuous
servicing.
1. Introduction
Hackers no longer try to find unknown bugs, but instead
attempt to exploit the latency between bugs disclosure and
correction. Indeed, analysis of recent worms such as Sasser
and Witty [12], showed that their creators exploited vulner-
abilities that had just been published by security experts.
This kind of attack is particularly problematic for applica-
tions such as wu-ftpd and Apache that must meet both up-
time and performance constraints. Therefore, on bug disclo-
sure such applications must run unprotected until the next
scheduled update.
To protect applications against attacks while meeting up-
time and performance constraints, we propose to correct
vulnerabilities at runtime as soon as these are discovered.
This approach requires both a technology to apply the up-
date and a mean of ensuring that the new code does not
interact badly with the current application state. As an in-
tegration technology, we propose to use Arachne, a runtime
binary rewriting tool [3]. The contribution of this paper lies
in how we address the verification issue. We have observed
that most attacks exploit only three kinds of vulnerabilities:
buffer overflows, double free bugs, and format string bugs.
Our contribution resides hence in a set of three generic, pre-
made patches each correcting one of these vulnerabilities
without disturbing normal execution and with low perfor-
mance loss. Our patches are applicable at runtime on any C
written application on an IA-32 Linux platform. Using our
approach, we may protect against 45% of attacks reported
by Debian security in 2005 over C softwares.
Our patches has to be configured by system administra-
tors to properly locate bugs (e.g. the buffer name for a buffer
overflow) and to define the action taken on attack detection.
The location information is used to protect only the vulner-
able code and thus limit the cost of the protection mech-
anism. The action can be either to abort the application
or to choose an appropriate behavior (e.g. to ignore out of
bounds data on a buffer overflow or to resize the vulnerable
buffer) and to continue. Hence it permits not only to detect
attacks but also to correct vulnerabilities at runtime. Once
the patch is configured, it is injected into the program at
runtime through the Arachne binary rewriting tool. As the
protection is injected only when a vulnerability is known to
exist, the cost induced by the protection is only paid when
necessary. Furthermore, the dynamic injection and resum-
ing capability of our patches respect uptime constraints of
servers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follow, Section 2
starts with an overview of buffer overflows, double free
bugs and format string bugs, followed by the workflow we
propose to correct vulnerabilities at runtime. In Section 3,
we show how our patches are configured by the system ad-
ministrator, how they are injected dynamically into the run-
ning application, and how they detect and protect against
exploit attempts. In Section 4, we evaluate our proposal in
terms of ease of use, performance and security coverage.
Section 5 discusses related work and Section 6 concludes.
2. Dynamic Patching
This section first briefly presents the vulnerabilities we
target, and then describes the workflow followed by system
administrators to correct vulnerabilities at runtime.
2.1. Vulnerability description
Binary injection attacks require modifying data in the
process’ memory, whether control data (e.g. the function
return address) in order to execute malicious code, or non-
control data (e.g. user permissions associated with a file de-
scriptor). Buffer overflows, double free bugs and format
string bugs are three common vulnerabilities that can be ex-
ploited in order to write arbitrary values at arbitrary loca-
tions or to read sensitive data.
Buffer overflow is the most common vulnerability ex-
ploited by hackers and have been extensively analyzed [5].
Buffers, whatever their allocation mechanism is (static, dy-
namic, heap, stack), may overflow when no check ensures
the data written into it actually fits in. When a buffer over-
flows, data structures adjacent to it in memory are overwrit-
ten by extra data. This is often exploited by hackers in order
to deviate the target program’s control flow to a specific lo-
cation, e.g. a shell code.
Double free bugs appear when a not previously allocated
memory block is freed. The GNU C library does not check
the proper allocation before freeing a memory block. When
a hacker can force the program to free a buffer twice and
to reallocate it, he can trick the GNU C library into rewrit-
ing a given location with an arbitrary value. This bug is
not proper to the GNU C library. Other standard library
implementations suffer from the double free vulnerability,
including system V AT&T implementation and Microsoft
Windows implementation, namely RtlHeap.
Format string bugs Functions in the printf family use
a format string made of wildcards to describe the remain-
ing arguments. When a printf-like function uses user
input as the format string, a hacker can force the function
to use arguments that are not present. As arguments are
passed via the stack, the program can be tricked into treat-
ing improper stack values as parameters. Typically, the %n
directive, which stores the number of characters written at
the address given in the corresponding argument permits
to rewrite an arbitrary word at an arbitrary place. Format





















Figure 1. Workflow of dynamic patching
but affect all variadic functions: functions that accept vari-
able number of arguments, as neither the C language nor the
execution environment ensure proper consumption (number
and type) of arguments passed to variadic functions.
2.2. Workflow
In this section, we describe the workflow we propose to
adopt to correct vulnerabilities at runtime. When a vulner-
ability is discovered in an application by developers, secu-
rity experts or external contributors, a security alert is pub-
lished through mailing list or security centers (Figure 1,➀).
This bulletin provides information such as the application
affected, the vulnerability type, its severity, and others. It
may also contains instructions to isolate the problem or a
patch.
When the system administrator receive this security bul-
letin ➁, in addition to determine if the vulnerability con-
cerns a software installed on his network, the system admin-
istrator has to find first if the software affected is C written
and second if the vulnerability is a Buffer Overflow, a Dou-
ble Free, or a Format String. Then according to the vulner-
ability’s type, the system administrator has to retrieve the
bug location from the security bulletin, the application and
a patch optionally provided (in Section 2.1 we describe the
information required). Then the system administrator may
choose between different types of actions to be taken upon
the detection of an exploit attempt. In Section 4.1, we show
this whole step can be done in about 8 minutes.
Once the patch has been configured, it is dynamically
injected into the running application ➂. For this, we use
Arachne, our binary rewriting API descibed in Section 3.2.
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3. Implementation
In this section, we first describe the patch configura-
tion process. We then present the techniques used to sup-
port runtime patch injection. And finally, we explain how
our patches handle to detect and protect against exploit at-
tempts.
3.1. Patch configuration
The system administrator must provide information al-
lowing our tool to locate and to correct only the vulnera-
bility targeted. In most cases, this information is enclosed
in the security bulletin. In the case of a buffer overflow,
our tool needs the name of the buffer. For the correction
of a format string bug, the tool requires the name of the
vulnerable variadic function. Only double free bugs do not
require any user-provided information as our patch corrects
every potential double free bug. Additionally, to further re-
duce the protection overhead, the user may provide names
of functions in which buffers are accessed in an illegal way,
or illegal calls are made to a variadic function or to free.
Once the system administrator has described the vulner-
ability to be corrected, he can choose between various be-
haviors carried out upon the detection of an exploitation at-
tempt. Even if most of the literature advise to abort the pro-
gram execution upon an attack, Rinard and al. have pointed
out that in certain cases it is preferable to continue the pro-
gram execution after prohibiting the attempt [11]. Our tool
allows the user to select one of these two solutions. When
resuming is chosen, the behavior depends on the vulnera-
bility type. On an invalid read access attempt caused by a
buffer overflow or a format string bug, the patch returns a
dummy or user-specified value. Invalid writes for Buffer
Overflows and Format String Bugs or invalid calls to free
for double free bugs are simply skipped.
3.2. Patch injection
Once configured, patches are merged with the running
application through the binary rewriting API of Arachne, a
prototype developed in our previous work on runtime soft-
ware modifications [3]. Arachne is independent of both
compiler and runtime environment and is thus applicable to
any ABI compliant software running on any x86 machine.
As an instrumentation back-end of our just-in-time protec-
tion, Arachne’s API is responsible of loading patches in the
address space of the application prior its instrumentation
and handling all the nitty-gritty of the binary manipulations.
These operations should be carried out without suspending
the execution of the application and in a reliable fashion.
Patches are compiled into native shared dynamically
linked libraries. Arachne’s API performs the patch injec-
tion in two steps. First, the Arachne instrumentation kernel
is injected into the application’s address space through the
regular Unix debugging API (ptrace). This API imposes
to suspend the application during the kernel injection: in
practice, the duration of this suspension is about 100 ms on
a Pentium 4. Once the kernel is loaded, it creates a thread
in the application process, and waits for patch injection re-
quests.
The code dynamically modified depends on the tar-
geted vulnerability. The patch handling buffer overflows
checks the size of any data written in dynamically allo-
cated memory: it instructs Arachne to rewrite the stan-
dard function call (i.e. malloc) used to allocate memory.
The patch handling double free bugs rewrites calls that dy-
namically allocate (i.e. malloc) and liberate (i.e. free)
memory. The patch handling format string bugs instru-
ments the invocations of the standard functions using for-
mat string arguments (i.e. printf, fprintf, sprintf
and snprintf).
3.3. Exploit attempt detection
Buffer overflows Preventing a buffer overflow requires
ensuring that there is no update modifying a location out-
side the boundary of the buffer. To achieve this indepen-
dently of the target application, our pre-made patch reallo-
cates the vulnerable buffer into a protected memory page.
The application is then dynamically rewritten, so that it ref-
erences the new location of the buffer. As the used memory
page is read and write protected, every access to it triggers
a ”invalid memory reference” signal, SIGSEGV. This signal
is trapped by the patch that compares the accessed location
with the buffer limits before modifying the original data.
Our patch stores the location of an eventual signal han-
dler registered by the application. When a SIGSEGV signal
is triggered, our patch tests the source of the memory vi-
olation to determine if it has to be handled by the patch’s
signal handler or the original one. In addition, future calls
to signal handler registering routines are monitored to en-
able base program to act normally.
Double free bugs The prevention from a double free bug
requires ensuring that no block is freed when it was not ac-
tually allocated. Once applied, our pre-made patch moni-
tors every call to allocation and free functions, and traces
the allocated and freed blocks. On each free, the patch
checks whether the call is legal. This check can be limited
to calls specified by the system administrator to limit the
overhead.
Here, our patch acts as an additional layer between the
program and the memory allocation routines. Thus, it is
independent of the implementation of these routines (GNU
C library, System V AT&T. . . ).
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Format string bugs Preventing format string bugs re-
quires ensuring a variadic function only accesses the pro-
vided parameters. On call of a variadic function, our patch
checks the actual number of arguments passed. It also
rewrites the body of the variadic function by replacing ev-
ery parameter access with an int3 instruction that triggers
a signal SIGTRAP. The original instructions are thereby re-
located in the signal handler. Then for each access, it com-
pares the location accessed with the actual location of the
parameter.
As previously described for buffer overflow patch, an
eventual signal handler registered for SIGTRAP is pre-
served, to permit the program to act as would normally do.
4. Evaluation
To be useful our proposal must meet three goals. First it
must be easily applicable by system administrators. Second
it has to be efficient enough for the application to continue
its task with a minimum overhead. Third it must be effec-
tive in detecting and forbidding attacks. For the first goal,
we present statistics computed on 2005’s security vulnera-
bilities found in open source softwares. We analyzed each
bulletins in order to evaluate the time needed to find infor-
mation about the security vulnerability. We show that for
more than 60% of the vulnerabilities our patches target, the
information required can be gathered manually in approx-
imatively 8 minutes. To experiment with the second goal,
we evaluated the overhead induced by our patches. We first
present micro-benchmarks of our solutions for each of the
bugs we handle. Then, we show macro-benchmarks that
compare our proposal applied to the well-known ftp server
wu-ftpd to its unprotected version. This shows that even
if our solution might seem locally expensive, this overhead
is negligible in large applications, making it suitable for real
world applications. To assess the last goal, we discuss se-
curity coverage issues for each of our patches.
4.1. Approach feasibility
To evaluate the time invested by system administrators
on bug disclosure to configure our dynamic patches, we
computed statistics on security vulnerabilities found in open
source softwares. We have chosen Debian security as a
source of information as it covers a wide range of open
source softwares. Debian reported 882 security bulletins
since 1997, 97 for 2005.
Figure 2 presents language repartition of the vulnerabil-
ities studied, 69% concern C softwares, 12% C++, other
languages are shell scripting languages, python, perl and
php. Over the C vulnerabilities referenced we recorded
that 45% falls into vulnerabilities our patches correct:
35% buffer overflows, 2% double free bugs and 8% for-
mat string bugs. Other vulnerability types - race condition,
missing privilege drop, input sanitizing or glob pattern -







Figure 2. Language repartition of vulnerabili-
ties in open source softwares as reported by





Figure 3. Vulnerabilities in open source C
softwares as reported by Debian Security in
2005
For each buffer overflow, double free bug or format
string bugs in C softwares, we measured the time needed to
find enough information to configure our dynamic patches.
As our patches does not require any source patch, we choose
not to use any patches provided, we only used the bulletin
itself and the application source code. Also, we excluded
any automatic tools for vulnerability detection, we only
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used cscope, a C cross reference tool to navigate applica-
tion source code. We considered that system administrators
would not devote more than 20 minutes per patch and then
considered it as a hard limit for information extraction.
In over 20% of the alerts examined, there were no or
irrelevant information in the bulletins, hence it was impos-
sible to identify the vulnerability location. In such situa-
tion our proposal can not be used. Nevertheless we argue
that such bulletins are no help either to hackers looking for
vulnerabilities. Hence, there are fewer chances that an ex-
ploit will be developed quickly after the security alert. For
16% of the vulnerabilities, bulletins supply a source file
name where the vulnerability is located. These cases are
also problematic as it is quiet difficult to find relevant in-
formation rapidly, indeed source files are sometimes, like in
sendmail, larger than 8000 lines of code. We were able to
do it only for format string bugs because variadic functions
are easy to find even in huge source files. Again we argue
that this situation will not permit a hacker to exploit a buffer
overflow after its disclosure.
For the remaining bulletins (63%), the given starting
point was a function name. Because of different coding
styles, function length may vary from few lines to hundreds
of. For all these bulletins except one, we were able to iden-
tify the vulnerabilities in about 8 minutes. Figure 4 summa-
rizes our success/failure in attempting to locate vulnerabili-
ties according to information provided by security bulletins
and no source patch were provided.












Figure 4. Success to locate vulnerabilities de-
pending on information provided
The statistics we conducted clearly assess our solution
can help in protecting applications against real vulnerabili-
ties. Indeed, our solutions is practicable in approximatively
65% of buffer overflows, double free bugs and format string
bugs in few minutes even when a patch does not exist yet.
Moreover, we argue that when a patch is actually present,
our solution is even quicker to apply as patches directly
points relevant information.
4.2. Micro-benchmarks
To estimate the cost for each patch we implemented, we
compared the cost of a normal execution with the one of the
protected version of the application.
We had to address several problems to obtain fair mea-
surements: (i) Pentium processors can reorder executed in-
structions, (ii) execution time of an instruction is dependent
on the preceding one and (iii) experiments can be preempted
during measurement. To avoid these problems, we (i) used
serializing instructions that force the processor to process
preceding instructions before continuation (these serializa-
tion instructions are not part of the measure), (ii) measured
thousands of repetitions of the concerning execution at once
and (iii) used the getrusage function to drop measures
when the process had been preempted. Compared to Intel
specifications that state an nop average instruction dura-
tion of 1 cycle, our experimental protocol permits to obtain
a relative error of only 1.6%. Table 1 summarizes our ex-
perimental results.
Using Arachne in order to protect a buffer from an over-
flow implies that each access made to this buffer costs 9729
cycles instead of 1 cycle in its native version. This cost is
easily explained by the fact that our patch introduces sig-
nals which imply context switches between kernel space
and user space.
In order to protect an application against double free
bug exploitation, our solution tracks memory allocation and
deallocation, to detect and forbid freeing of already non-
allocated memory. The gnu C library performs a call to
malloc in 72 cycles and a call to free in 66 cycles. Our
protected implementation extends malloc and free to
monitor allocated and freed memory block using a hash ta-
ble. This costs 5.1 times, and 5.7 times respectively, more
than the gnu C library implementation.
Our solution for format string bugs relies on checking ev-
ery parameter access made by a variadic function to validate
that the requested location is actually that of a parameter.
Each protected access is 2762 times slower than its native
version. Again the reason for this, is the use of signals to
trap accesses.
4.3. Macro-benchmarks
We also experimented with our patches on the real world
application wu-ftpd (Washington University File Trans-
fer Protocol Daemon), a widely deployed File Transfer Pro-
tocol service. It is a base for development of other ftp





buffer read 9729 1 9729
malloc 372 72 5.1
free 378 66 5.7
param read 2762 1 2762
Table 1. Micro-benchmarks on patch protec-
tion mechanisms.
We performed our measures for a patched version of wu-
ftpd, we chose to correct a buffer overflow vulnerability
identified in the s/key authentication mechanism discovered
in 2004 and referenced by the Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures under the identifier CVE-2004-0185. This vul-
nerability considered highly critical, permits a remote at-
tacker to gain administrator access or to cause a Denial of
Service.
In order to evaluate wu-ftpd’s performance, we used
dkftpbench [6], a benchmarking tool for FTP servers.
dkftpbench permits to stress ftp servers by faking client’s
connections through automatons. Each false client authen-
ticates to the server, retrieve a given file, and disconnect.
dkftpbench constantly create new automatons and then
permits to measure instant/average/max number of simul-
taneous users. We performed our measure between 2 ma-
chines: one for dkftpbench and one for wu-ftpd over a
100 Mb/s Ethernet. wu-ftpd was running on a Pentium 4
3.3 GHz with 512 MB RAM. Each file retrieved was 5 MB
long and network bandwidth dedicated to each client was
set so that network never reached congestion.
We measured the maximum simultaneous users served
by wu-ftpd when running unprotected and protected. Re-
sults shows no significant difference between the two ver-
sions 1008, and respectively 1012 simultaneous users. This
demonstrates that even if our patches might seem locally
resources consuming, they are clearly suitable in real world
situations by permitting to protect applications against at-
tacks without impacting significantly on performance.
4.4. Security coverage
For dynamically allocated buffers, the size is only known
at allocation-time. Thus our patch can only protect dynam-
ically allocated buffers that have been allocated after the
patch is injected. Similarly, double free bugs cannot be for-
bidden if the block allocation occurred before the patch in-
jection. Furthermore, if the first event caught is a free,
there is no way to know if it is legal or not. When attack-
ing servers, data exploited are often short lived data as they
correspond to requests, thus even if our solution might not
protect some data during a short period after injection, it
becomes effective quickly when a new request is received.
Our patch for format string bugs ensures that every ac-
cess to parameters will reach a parameter. This fails un-
der certain circumstances to protect against format string
attacks. Our patch won’t check for type correctness of the
parameters. Even if an exploitation is still theoretical pos-
sible, this is very difficult as the hacker would have to pass
both specially crafted format string and parameters.
5. Related work
To our knowledge, no security solution addresses both
uptime and performance constraints. For example, the usual
patching process with the patch tool requires a patch and
to stop the application. To permit patching without requir-
ing to stop the service provided, hardware replication might
be used [10]. This solution implies additional investment
and maintenance load. Moreover it may requires complex
techniques to duplicate/transfer current state and work in
progress between machines.
Compiler extensions techniques [2, 5] detect both buffer
overflows and format string bugs by inserting additional
source code prior to compilation to enforce checks on buffer
boundaries and variadic functions’ usage. Because these so-
lutions attempt to protect all buffer to overflow or all poten-
tial format string miss-usage, they introduce an important
overhead of up to 400% depending on the application usage
of buffers and variadic functions. As our solution focuses
on bugs that are likely to be exploited, its consumes fewer
resources.
The GNU C library proposes a environment variable
MALLOC CHECK to set up the memory allocation mecha-
nisms to correct at runtime memory corruption due to dou-
ble free bugs. Most general Linux distributions deactivate
this option as it severely impacts on performance. Our patch
for double free bugs contrary to the GNU C library protec-
tion can be activated/deactivated at runtime, and thus per-
mits to better deal with performance issues.
The PaX Project proposes two mechanisms to harden
bugs exploitation [9]. First, non-executable protection that
makes heap and stack segments non executable permits to
protect against shell code execution. Nevertheless the new
attack strategy ”return-into-lib(c)” permitted to defeat non-
executable pages [13]. As ”return-into-lib(c)” attacks relies
on the knowledge of functions address, the second mecha-
nism proposed, ASLR, Address Space Layout Randomiza-
tion adds a new order of difficulty for hackers. Neverthe-
less, again hackers have shown that ASLR mechanism was
not generating enough entropy to effectively protect against
brute force attacks [8]
Chen and al. propose a hardware based solution to tackle
binary injection attacks [1]. They propose to track values
provided through user inputs and to forbid dereferencing of
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such values. This solution induces an important memory
loss (a bit is associated to every byte in memory) and con-
sider a value to be sanitized once any check has been per-
formed on it. This strategy is arguable as it will not detect
attacks through user inputs with but not enough, sanitizing.
Modern IDEs such as Eclipse and IntelliJ IDEA pro-
pose an ”Edit and Continue” feature based on Java HotSwap
[14]. While this approach permits runtime code patching,
debugging options required at load-time makes it less suit-
able to cope with the unanticipated nature of bugs. The
C/C++ interpreter CINT [4], also permits runtime code
modification, but does not fully support the C language and
is not multi-thread safe, hence it might not suit well to real
world applications.
We previously proposed a solution based on source patch
transformation. We built Minerve a source patch to aspect
transformer [7]. Used in conjonction with Arachne, Min-
erve permits to automaticaly and dynamicaly apply source
patch at runtime. While this solution copes with both up-
time and security issues, it suffers from few drawbacks.
First, it always requires a patch to be provided. Second,
it is hard even sometimes impossible to ensure a patch de-
veloped with no dynamic issues in mind, may be applied at
runtime.
6. Conclusion
In this article we have proposed a solution to correct
common vulnerabilities in C written applications. In the
context of highly available servers, our approach proves as
a well-suited solution and ensures service continuity. With
our three pre-made patches for the just-in-time correction,
we cover 45% of the attacks affecting C softwares reported
by Debian security in 2005.
Being transparent for the corrected process, our solution
does not impose any modification on the compilation or ex-
ecution environment. Moreover, the configurability of our
pre-made patches lets the system administrator define the
action carried out on an attack, and limit the overhead of
the protection mechanism.
We show the configuration made by the system admin-
istrator could be made with few effort (approximatively
8 minutes per patch). Nevertheless, our solution would
clearly benefits from its support by a central authority and
developers that would relieve system administrators from
the largest part of the configuration process.
After having evaluated our approach on the wu-ftpd
server, we now intend to investigate the performance on fur-
ther server applications. Preliminary tests on the Web cache
Squid have already confirmed the suitability of our solution.
In addition, we will work on the extension of our approach
to tackle the remaining 55% of reported vulnerabilities, no-
ticeably race conditions.
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